Identifying the anomalies is a critical task to maintain the uptime of the monitored distributed systems. For this reason, the trace data collected from real time monitors are often provided in form of streams for anomaly detection. Due to the dramatic increase of the scale of modern distributed systems, it is challenging to effectively and efficiently discover the anomalies from a voluminous amount of noisy and high-dimensional data streams. Moreover, the evolving of the system infrastructures brings new anomaly types that cannot be generalized as existing ones, making the existing anomaly detection solutions unavailable.
Introduction
A homogeneous distributed environment generally consists of multiple computing nodes with the same hardware configuration, software environment and similar workloads. A typical example of the homogeneous distributed environment is the load-balanced system, which is widely used at the backend by the popular large-scale web sites like Amazon, Google and Facebook. In such a distributed environment, the computing nodes in a distributed system would behave similar to each other in the ideal situation (no anomaly and no occasional fluctuation). In such a situation, the observations (in terms of monitored metrics) of the nodes should be close to each other at any time. In practice, node anomaly might be caused by a variety of reasons, such as software aging, resource contention, and hardware failure, making the affected nodes behave differently from other nodes (Grottke & Trivedi, 2007) . Overtime, a system is becoming more instable and it would fail to function properly due to the existence of anomaly nodes. Although the health-related data are collected across the system for troubleshooting, unfortunately how to effectively and efficiently identify anomalies and their root causes in the data has never been as straightforward as one would expect.
Traditionally, domain experts are responsible for examining the data with their experience and expertise. Such a manual process is time-consuming, error-prone, and even worse, not scalable.
Due to the data scale and complexity, event the domain experts cannot fully identify the true anomalies and may also missing some deeply hidden anomalies. Moreover, as the behaviors of the distributed environment are likely changing over time, such temporal dynamics is difficult to be captured by the domain experts, as they may not be able to refresh their knowledge quick enough.
As the size and complexity of computer systems continue to grow, the difficulty for automated anomaly identification increases dramatically and it have far beyond the processing capability of the domain experts. The traditional expert systems that encoded the rules of the domain experts can only partially addressed the data scale problem. However, they cannot solve the complexity problem. This is because a distributed environment is dynamic. It is not likely such changing behaviors can be well captured by the static rules. Overtime, the deployed expert system based anomaly detection would gradually be outdated, as the rate of false positive and false negative would increase.
There are quite a few data processing and anomaly analysis infrastructures to enable automated anomaly identification. However, these existing data processing infrastructures are designed based on inherent non-stream programming paradigm such as Map/Reduce (Dean & Ghemawat, 2008) , Bulk Synchronous Parallel (BSP) (Valiant, 1990) , and their variations. To reduce the processing delay, these applications have gradually migrated to stream processing engines (Arasu et al., 2003; Chandrasekaran et al., 2003) . As the infrastructures have been changed, anomalies in these applications are required to be identified online across multiple data streams. The new data characteristics and analysis requirements make existing anomaly detection solutions no longer suitable.
To address the problem, in this paper, we present a real time mechanism for node anomaly detection by taking both the node context information and the node historical information into consideration from multiple data streams. Figure 1 illustrates the scenario of monitoring a 6-node computer cluster, where the x-axis denotes the time and the y-axis denotes the CPU utilization. The cluster has been monitored during time [0, t6] . At time t2, a computing task has been submitted to the cluster and the cluster finishes this task at time t4. As shown in Figure 1 , two nodes (marked in dashed line) behave differently from the majority during some specific time periods. Node 1 has a high CPU utilization during 1 2 [ , ] t t and a low CPU utilization during 3 4 [ , ] t t while node 2 has a medium CPU utilization all the time. These two nodes with their associated abnormal periods are regarded as anomalies. Besides these two obvious anomalies, there is a slight delay on node 3 due to the network delay and a transient fluctuation on node 4 due to some random factors. However, they are normal phenomena in distributed systems and are not regarded as anomalies. A quick solution for stream based anomaly detection is to leverage the techniques of complex event processing (CEP) [3, 4] by expressing the anomalies detection rules with corresponding continuous query statements. This rule-based detection method can be applied to the scenarios where the anomaly can be clearly defined. Besides using CEP, several stream based anomaly detection algorithms have also been proposed. They either focus on identifying the contextual anomaly over a collection of stable streams (Bu et al., 2009) or the collective anomaly from one stream (Anguilli & Fassetti, 2007; Pokrajac, Lazarevic, & Latecki, 2007) . These existing methods are useful in many applications but they still cannot identify certain types of anomalies. Figure 2 plots the ground truth as well as all the anomalies identified by existing methods including the CEP query with three different rules (Rule-CQ1, 2, and 3), the collective based anomaly detection (Breunig et al., 2000) , and contextual based anomaly detection (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar, 2009 ). To detect the anomalies via CEP query, the idea is to capture the events when the CPU utilizations of nodes are too high or too low. An example query following the syntax of (Agrawal et al., 2008) can be written as follows:
A Motivating Example

PATTERN SEQ(Observation o[])
WHERE avg(o[].cpu) oper threshold (AND|OR avg(o[].cpu) oper threshold)* WITHIN {length of sliding window}
where the selection condition in WHERE clause is the conjunction of one or more boolean expressions, oper is one of f>, <, <>, ==g, and threshold can be replaced by any valid expression.
However, CEP queries are unable to correctly identify the anomalies in Figure 1 The main reason is that the continuous query statement is not suitable to capture the contextual information where the "normal" behaviors are also dynamic (the utilizations of normal nodes also change over time in Figure 1 ).
Compared with CEP based methods, contextual anomaly detection methods (such as Gupta et al., 2013; Jiang, Chen, & Yoshihira, 2006 ) achieve a better accuracy as they utilize the contextual information of all the streams. However, one limitation of contextual based methods is that they do not leverage the temporal information of streams and are not suitable for anomaly detection in dynamic environments.
Therefore, these methods would wrongly identify the slightly delayed and fluctuated nodes as anomalies. For the given example, collective anomaly detection methods do not work well neither. This is because these methods would identify the anomaly of each stream based on its normal behaviors. Once the current behavior of a stream is different from its normal behaviors (identified based on historical data), it is considered as abnormal. In the example, when the cluster works on the task during time period 3 4 [ , ] t t , all the working nodes would be identified as abnormal due to the sudden burst.
Contributions
In this paper, we propose an efficient solution to identify this special type of anomaly in the above example, named contextual collective anomaly. Contextual collective anomalies bear the characteristics of both contextual anomalies and collective anomalies. This type of anomaly is common in homogeneous distributed system monitoring, where data come from distributed but homogeneous data sources. We will formally define this type of anomaly in Section 2.
Besides proposing an algorithm to discover the contextual collective anomalies over a collection of data streams, we also consider the scale-out ability of our solution and develop a distributed streaming processing framework for contextual collective anomaly detection. More concretely, our contributions can be described as follows: l We discuss the existing work of anomaly detection, especially streaming anomaly detection, and explain why the current types of anomalies cannot fully cover all the situations and why we need a new anomaly detection framework. l We provide the definition of contextual collective anomaly and propose an incremental algorithm to discover the contextual collective anomalies in real time. The proposed algorithm combines the contextual as well as the historical information to effectively identify the anomalies. l We propose a flexible three-stage framework to discover such anomalies from multiple data streams. This framework is designed to be distributed and can be used to handle large scale data by scaling out the computing resources. Moreover, each component in the framework is pluggable and can be replaced if a better solution is proposed in the future. l We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our solution through the real world scenario experiments and show that our solution has a better accuracy when system appears CPU-related faults, or IO-related faults, or a combinatory of these faults.
The Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a definition of contextual collective anomaly and then presents the problem statement. Section 3 provides an overview of our proposed anomaly detection framework. We introduce the three-stage anomaly detection algorithm in detail in Section 4. Section 5 presents the result of experimental evaluation. The related works are discussed in Section 6. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.
The Problem Statement
In this section, we first give the notations and definitions that are relevant to the anomaly detection problem and make it clear through Figure 3 . Then, we formally define the problem based on the given notations and definitions. The nth data stream
The 2nd data stream , ,..., n S S S S = is a collection of the corresponding data streams from n computing nodes.
The input of our anomaly detection framework is a stream collection. For instance, in the motivating example, the input stream collection is
which captures the configuration of the stream collection S at time t and makes it easy to diagnose anomalies across different nodes.
Definition 4. Snapshot Anomaly Score. Given a snapshot ( ) there is a high false-positive if we use a snapshot anomaly score only. To solve this issue, we take the historical information of a data stream into consideration to detect abnormal data streams. And we call this special type of anomaly as contextual collective anomaly.
Definition 5. Contextual Collective Anomaly. A contextual collective stream anomaly is denoted as a tuple ,[ , ], i b e i S t t N < > , where i S is the i-th data stream from the collection of data streams S, [ , ] b e t t is the associated time period when i S is observed to constantly deviate from the majority streams in S, and ( , )
indicates the severity of the anomaly, where i Q denotes the snapshot anomaly score of data stream i S , i I measures the influence of the historical observation of data stream i S and h is a function reflecting the idea of integrating the contextual information and the historical information.
In the motivating example, three contextual collective anomalies can be found in total. During time period 1 2 [ , ] t t , node 1 behaves constantly different from the other nodes, so there is an
The other two contextual collective anomalies,
> , can also be found with the same reason.
Problem Definition. The anomaly detection problem in our paper can be described below: Given a stream collection
, identify the source of the contextual collective anomalies i S , the associated time period [ , ] b e t t , as well as an anomaly quantification. Moreover, the detection has to be conducted on data streams that look-back is not allowed and the anomalies need to be identified in real time.
The System Framework
In this paper, we focus on detecting contextual collective anomalies in homogeneous collection of nodes (also called "groups"), and our proposed framework is shown as Figure 4 . Our anomaly detection is based on two key observations. First, the nodes performing comparable activities generally exhibit similar behaviors (Tabatabaee & Hollingsworth, 2007; Mirgorodskiy, Maruyama, & Miller, 2006) . Second, faults are rare events, so the majority of system nodes are functioning normally. For each group, three tightly coupled stages including the preprocessing stage, the scoring stage, and the alert stage, are applied to find the nodes that exhibit different behaviors from the majority. The functionality of the three stages is briefly described below. On receiving the observations from external data sources, this stage is responsible for data stream preprocessing including common data preprocessing, snapshot acquisition, and snapshot dispatching.
Possible common data preprocessing includes converting variable-spaced time series to constant-spaced ones, filling in missing samplings, generating real-value samples from system logs, and removing period spikes or noises. After common data preprocessing, data streams are assembled into snapshots. Finally, dispatchers are used to shuffle the snapshots to different downstream processing components. l The Scoring stage This stage quantifies the candidate anomalies using the snapshot scorer followed by the stream scorer.
The snapshot scorer leverages contextual information to quantify the confidence of anomaly for each data instance at a given snapshot. Taking Figure 5 for example, it shows the data distribution by taking the snapshot of the 2-dimensional data instances of 500 streams at timestamp t. As shown, most of the data instances are close to each other and located in a dense area. These data instances are not likely to be identified as anomalies as their instance anomaly scores are small. On the contrary, a small portion of the data instances (those points that are far away from the dense region) have larger instance anomaly scores and are more likely to be abnormal. Figure 5 The snapshot at a certain timestamp A data instance with a high anomaly score does not indisputably indicate its corresponding stream to be a real anomaly. This is because the transient fluctuation and phase shift are common in real world distributed environment. To mitigate such effects, the stream scorer is designed to handle the problem.
In particular, the stream scorer combines the information obtained from the instance scorer and the historical information of each stream to quantify the anomaly confidence of each stream. l The Alert stage.
The alert stage contains the alter trigger. The alert triggers leverage the unsupervised learning methods to identify and report the outliers. The advantage of our framework is reflected by the ease of integration, the flexibility, and the algorithm independence. Firstly, any external data sources can be easily fed to the framework for anomaly detection. Moreover, the components in every stage can be scaled-out to increase the processing capability if necessary. The number of components in each stage can be easily customized according to the data scale of different real applications. Furthermore, the algorithms in each stage can be replaced and upgraded with better alternatives and the replacement would not interfere with other stages.
To truly make the above mechanism useful in practice, we intend to provide two guarantees in the design of our anomaly identification system. First is the high accuracy, in terms of the low false alarm rate and extremely low missed rate (i.e., close to zero). Second is the time efficiency, meaning to quickly identify faulty nodes from the data collected, no matter how large are the data. The first guarantee is essential for the usefulness and effectiveness of the method, while the second guarantee is needed for quick detection and timely response.
Methodology
In this section, we present the details of our node anomaly detection mechanism.
Snapshot Acquisition & Dispatching
The goal of this step is to gather the system data for representing node behaviors, transform the data into a uniform format called as snapshot, and then dispatch them for data analysis.
The dispatching sub-step is an auxiliary stage in our framework. When the data scale (i.e., the number of streams) is too large for a single computing component to process, the dispatcher would shuffle the received observations to downstream computing components in the scoring stage. By leveraging random shuffling algorithm like Fisher-Yates shuffle (Fisher et al., 1949) , dispatching can be conducted in constant time per observation. After dispatching, each downstream component would conduct scoring independently on sampled stream observations with identical distribution.
Snapshot Anomaly Quantification
Quantifying the anomaly in a snapshot is the first task in the scoring stage and we leverage snapshot scorer in this step. This score measures the amount of deviation of the specified observation sit to the center of all the observations in a snapshot at timestamp t.
A common solution to quantify the anomaly score of multi-dimension data is Local Outlier Factor (LOF) (Breunig et al., 2000) . In principle, LOF measures the anomaly score using density-based clustering. This method is useful for online mining but is not suitable in our scenario due to the following two limitations: (1) LOF is not aware of the scale inconsistency among different dimensions.
For dimensions with inconsistent scales, LOF would be dominated by the dimensions with large scales.
Taking the system monitoring application for example, the CPU utilization is represented by the percentage of clock ticks used per second, while the memory usage is represented by the amount of RAM in KB, MB or GB, for which the later has a much larger scale. When using LOF, the dimension of memory usage would dominate the anomaly score. (2) The time of computing LOF score of observations increases superlinearly (O(nlogn) as the number of observations increases. This time complexity is acceptable for online detection but is prohibitive for real time detection.
To address the above two limitations, we propose a simple yet efficient method to quantify the data instance anomaly scores. The basic idea is that the anomaly score of an observation is quantified as the amount of uncertainty it brings to the snapshot S (t) . As the observations in a snapshot follow the normal distribution, it is suitable to use the increase of entropy to measure the anomaly of an observation.
To quantify the anomaly score, two types of variance are needed: the variance and the leave-one-out variance, where the leave-one-out variance is the variance of the distribution when one specific data instance is not counted. ( ( (1)), ( (2) 
Summing up all dimensions, the snapshot anomaly score of it s is
Note that the computation implicitly ignores the correlation between dimensions. This is because if an observation is an outlier, the correlation effect would only deviate it further from other observations.
Stream Anomaly Quantification
As a stream is continuously evolving and its observations only reflect the transient behavior, snapshot anomaly score alone would result in a lot of false-positives due to the transient fluctuation and slight phase shift. To mitigate such situations, it is critical to quantify the stream anomaly by incorporating the historical information of the stream.
An intuitive way to solve this problem is to calculate the stream anomaly score from the recent historical instances stored in a sliding window. However, this solution has two obvious limitations: (1) It is hard to decide the window length. A long sliding window would miss the real anomaly while a short sliding window cannot rule out the false-positives.
(2) It ignores the impact of observations that are not in the sliding window. The observation that is just popped out from the sliding window would immediately and totally lose its impact to the stream.
To well balance the history and the current observation, we use stream anomaly score i N to quantify how significant a stream i S behaves differently from the majority of the streams. To quantify i N , we exploit the exponential decay function to control the influence depreciation. , where λ is a parameter to control the decay speed. In the experiment evaluation, we will discuss how this parameter affects the anomaly detection results.
To make the notation uncluttered, we use x i t − to denote the timestamp that is i t
Summing up the influences of all the historical observations, the overall historical influence it I for current timestamp t can be expressed as Equation (2). . 
The stream anomaly score of stream i S is the weighted summation of the data instance anomaly score of current observation it Q and the overall historical influence, i.e.,
where α denote the weight of anomaly score of current observation and in this paper we set 0.5 α = that means we make no discrimination on the contextual information and the historical information of a stream. As is shown in Equation (2), the overall historical influence can be incrementally updated with cost (1) O for both time and space complexity. Therefore, stream anomaly scorer can be efficiently computed.
Comparing to the transient fluctuation, the real anomaly is more durable. Figure 6 shows the situations of a transient fluctuation (in the left subfigure) and a real anomaly (in the right subfigure). In both situations, the stream behaves normally before timestamp x t . For the left situation, a transient fluctuation occurs at timestamp 1 x t + , and then the stream returns to normal at timestamp 
According to Equation (6), it is known that at timestamp 2 x t + , the effect of fluctuation at timestamp 1 x t + decreases. □ PROPERTY 2. The increase of stream anomaly score caused by anomaly would be accumulated over time.
PROOF. If a stream begins to be abnormal at timestamp 1 x t + , its data instance scores would become larger than those of the normal streams during the abnormal period. Suppose ε is the difference of the data instance scores between the abnormal stream i S and a normal stream j S , at timestamp 1 x t + . since both streams i S and j S are normal before timestamp 1 x t + , we have 
The difference of the stream anomaly scores is
At timestamp 2 x t + , since the stream i S is still in the abnormal period, the difference of data instance scores is still larger than or equal to ε , and the difference of stream anomaly scores between these two streams at timestamp
. 
According to Equation (7), we can conclude that once a stream becomes abnormal, the difference between its stream anomaly score and those of the normal streams would increase over time. □ Similar properties can also be shown for the situation of slight shifts. A slight shift can be treated as two transient fluctuations occur at the beginning and the end of the shift. In the next section, we will leverage these two properties to effectively identify the anomalies in the ALERT STAGE.
Alert Triggering
Most of the stream anomaly detection solutions (Ge et al., 2010) identify the anomalies by picking the streams with top-k anomaly scores or the ones whose scores exceed a predefined threshold. However, these two approaches are not practical in real world applications for the following reasons: (1) Threshold is hard to set. It requires the users to understand the underlying mechanism of the application to correctly set the parameter.
(2) The number of anomalies is changing all the time. It is possible that more than k anomaly streams exist at one time, then the top-k approach would miss these real anomalies.
To eliminate the parameters, we propose an unsupervised method to identify and quantify the anomalies by leveraging the distribution of the anomaly scores. The first step is to find the median of the stream anomaly scores median N . If the distance between a stream anomaly score and the median score is larger than the distance between the median score and the minimal score min N , the corresponding stream is regarded as abnormal. As shown in Figure 7 , this method implicitly defines a dynamic threshold (shown as the dashed line) based on the hypothesis that there is no anomaly. If there is no anomaly, the skewness of the anomaly score distribution should be small and the median score should be close to the mean score. If the hypothesis is true,
should be close to half of the distance between the minimum score and the maximum score. On the contrary, if a score i N is larger than Besides the general case, we also need to handle one special case: a transient fluctuation occurs at the current timestamp. According to Property (1) in Section 4.3, the effect of transient fluctuation is at most upper d and it will monotonically decrease. Therefore, even a stream whose anomaly score is larger than According to the property of convergent sequence, the stream anomaly scores of all streams would converge to this upper bound. When the values of stream anomaly scores are close to the upper bound, they tend to be close to each other and hard to be distinguished. To handle this problem, we reset all the stream anomaly scores to 0 whenever one of them close to the upper bound.
In terms of the time complexity, the abnormal streams can be found in
( )
O n time. Algorithm 2 illustrates the algorithm of stream anomalies identification. The median of the scores can be found in ( ) O n in the worst case using the BFPRT algorithm (Blum et al., 1973) . Besides finding the median, this algorithm also partially sorts the list by moving smaller scores before the median and larger scores after the median, making it trivial to identify the abnormal streams by only checking the streams appearing after the median. 
Experimental Evaluation
We evaluate our prototype implementation on a computing cluster by manually injecting a variety of system faults. While experimental evaluation with real faults would be better, a major problem with this approach is that we do not often have the luxury of allowing systems to run for many days to see their behaviors. Further, it is not guaranteed that the system will experience a variety of faults during the experimental time. The generally accepted solution to this problem is to inject the effects of faults in a system and observe the behavior of the system under the injected faults (Barton et al., 1990) . In our experiments, we are able to test the proposed anomaly detection algorithm on dozens of fault effects via fault injection, and show that our proposed framework can effectively and efficiently discover the abnormal behaviors of the computer nodes with high precision and low latency.
Experiment Settings
We use a Linux cluster at Nanjing University of Science & Technology (NUST) as our experiment platform, which consists of 76 computing nodes with 3.4GHz Intel I3 2 processors and connects each node via a Gigabit LAN. The cluster is running Unbtun 12.04 and Hadoop 0.20.2, and a parameter sweep application that is submitted on these nodes. The application solves dense linear equations by using Gaussian Elimination method, thereby performing comparable computation tasks.
We randomly inject faults into the experiment platform by generating faulty threads in the back end-separating from the application threads, and test whether different mechanisms can effectively identify the faulty nodes. Three random factors are considered in our fault injection. First is to decide how many nodes to inject faults, second is to determine which nodes to inject faults, and the last is to decide the type(s) of fault(s) to inject. In our experiments, less than 10 percent of all nodes are randomly selected for fault injection. The inclusion of the zero cases is to test our anomaly detection mechanism under a fault-free environment. Totally, four typical types of faults are tested as follows:
l Memory leaking: On randomly selected nodes, besides the normal computation threads, we introduce threads to generate memory leaking on the nodes, meaning that these threads continue consuming memory without releasing it periodically.
l Unterminated CPU-intensive threads: On randomly selected nodes, the injected threads compete for the CPU resource with the normal computation threads on the nodes. The source code of injection program is available at https://github.com/yxjiang/system-noiser. We select these faults based on the literature and our own experience on system log analysis (Gujrati et al., 2007; Gu et al., 2008; . For example, we have found that some job hang failures are triggered by deadlock, some network-related failures like packet loss are caused by heavy traffic volume, and some node map file failures are due to frequent IO operations. In our experiments, these faults are supposed to originate from the system rather than from the application. They can affect multiple subsystems in a node, including memory, CPU, I/O, and network, and eventually lead to system failure and/or performance degradation.
To collect the health-related data across the computing cluster for troubleshooting, we leverage a distributed system monitoring tool (Xu & Xu, 2009 ) developed in our previous work to collect 14 features from CPU, memory, I/O, and network per node at the operating system layer. These features are summarized in Table 1 . Then we deploy the proposed anomaly detection program on an external computer to analyze the collected trace data in real time. To well evaluate our proposed framework, we terminate all the irrelevant processes running on these nodes.
Results
We conduct two sets of experiments: 1) single-fault tests, where one type of faults are injected into the system and 2) multi-fault tests, where multiple types of faults are injected into the system. For each experiment, we conduct 10 runs and the results shown here are the averages of multiple runs. Through these injections, we can answer the following questions about our framework: (1) whether our framework can identify the anomalies with different types of root causes; (2) whether our framework can identify multiple anomalies occurring simultaneously.
Single-fault Tests
In the first set of experiments, we inject one type of faults onto 0-7 randomly selected nodes and assess whether our detection mechanism can correctly identify these abnormal nodes. The details of the partial injections are listed in Table 2 . abnormally. This is the simplest type of anomalies. It is generated by injections No.5 and No.8 in Table 2 . As shown in Figure 8 , our framework effectively identifies these anomalies with the correct time periods.
2. Multiple streams behave abnormally simultaneously. This type of anomalies is generated by injection No.5, No.6 and No.8 . During the injection time period, our framework correctly identifies both anomalies (on node 23, node 48 and node 69).
3. Transient fluctuation and slight delay would not cause false-positive. As this experiment is conducted in a distributed environment, delays exist and vary for different nodes when executing the injections. Despite this intervention, our framework still does not report transient fluctuations and slight delays as anomalies.
Based on the evaluation results, we find that our solution is able to correctly identify all the anomalies in all these three different cases.
Further, we will delve into the details about the effectiveness and efficiency of our framework.
To quantitatively measure the performance, we use F-measure to measure the accuracy and detection time delay to measure the efficiency. The precision and recall in computing F-measure are quantified according to the ground truth shown in Table 2 . To investigate how λ affects the results, we conducted experiments with various λ values.
The experimental results of how λ affects the results accuracy is illustrated in Figure 9 . To mitigate the randomness caused by the distributed environment, the precision, recall, and the F-measure are averaged with 10 runs. As shown, for the example of injecting CPU-related faults, as λ increases, precision increases but recall decreases. The reason for the decreasing of recall is as follows: The increase of λ causes the upper bound of stream anomaly scores to decrease and indirectly increases the reset frequency. After each reset of stream anomaly scores, some real anomalies would be skipped and they would reduce the recall. The result shows that the highest F-measure is 0.9351 while the lowest is 0.9032, which is stable. This is due to the changing of precision and recall cancels each other and makes F-measure insensitive to λ .This conclusion holds for other three cases. Last but not least, we also observe that detecting CPU-related faults has the highest accuracy, followed by IO-related faults, while detecting memory-related faults has the lowest accuracy, followed by network-related faults. We attribute this to the fact that CPU-related faults and IO-related faults can easily propagate throughout the system. In terms of the time delay, our proposed framework is able to identify the anomalies in real time.
As shown in Figure 10 , the experimental results indicate that the average time delay in all the experiments is less than 6 seconds. We also notice that there is an obvious variance of the time delay due to the experiments that are conducted in a distributed system, where the environment is highly dynamic. Since the delay consists of network delay, injection execution delay, and the detection delay, the actual delay of our detection method should be less than the observed value. 
Multi-fault Tests
In this set of experiments, different types of faults are simultaneously injected onto 0-3 nodes in the system. We have conducted experiments with two, three and four types of faults respectively.
However, the results for the cases of three and four types of faults, are very similar to those for two-fault tests. Thus, we focus on discussion of the results for two-fault tests. The details of the injections are listed in Table 3 . As λ increases, precision increases but recall decreases. Thus, we will discuss the effectiveness and efficiency of our framework from the results with the worst recall for two-faults tests listed in the Table 4 . Consistent with the conclusion that detecting CPU-related faults has the highest accuracy, followed by IO-related faults, while detecting memory-related faults has the lowest accuracy, followed by network-related faults draw from Figure 9 , we can also find that there is a higher detection accuracy when injecting CPU-related faults or IO-related faults than the case of injecting memory-related faults or network-related faults. Moreover, the worst accuracy we got is 0.8878 in the case of injections of memory-related faults and network-related ones simultaneously. But this result is still better than both results, 0.7783 and 0.8764, got in the case of injecting single memory-related fault or single network-related fault respectively. Similarly, we can find that this conclusion always holds in the remaining cases, which shows that our detection solution can work well under complex runtime environments. In terms of the time delay, the experimental results indicate that the time delay in all the experiments is less than 5 seconds and less than the average time delay in case of injecting four single faults respectively, which shows that our proposed framework can also identify the anomalies in real time in case of multi-fault tests. 
Comparison Analysis
To demonstrate the superiority of our framework, we also conduct experiments to identify the anomalies with the same injection settings described in Figure 11 using the alternative methods including contextual anomaly detection (CAD) and rule-based continuous query (Rule-CQ and report the results. Table 5 quantitatively shows the precision, recall, and F-measure of these methods as well as the results of our method. The contextual anomaly detection method generates a lot of false alerts. This is because this method is sensitive to the transient fluctuation. Once an observation deviates from the others at a timestamp, an alert would be triggered. Similarly, the Rule-CQ method also generates many false alerts since it is difficult to use rules to cover all the anomaly situations. The low-precision and high-recall results of CAD and Rule-CQ indicate that all these method are too sensitive to fluctuations. 
Related Works
Leveraging machine learning and data mining techniques to facilitate the system management is always a hot research direction in both the communities of system and data mining (Zheng et al., 2014; Jiang et al., 2011) . In this direction, automatic anomaly detection is an increasing popular topic that has drawn many interests from the researchers (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar 2009 ).
Over the recent years, continuously efforts are paid towards this topic. Generally speaking, there are mainly two groups of related research directions: the model-based anomaly detection and the data-driven anomaly detection.
A model-based approach derives a probabilistic or analytical solution by modeling the system in a parameterized way. Hellerstein et al. proposed a model that is able to quantify the severity of anomaly in an unsupervised approach. This anomaly detection model is able to trigger the warnings when a deviation from the normal status learned by the model is detected (Hellerstein, Zhang, & Shahabuddin, 2001) . Salehi et al. proposed an ensemble model based method to identify the anomalies in switching data streams (Salehi et al. 2014 ). Vaidynathan and Cross proposed an adaptive statistical data fitting method called MSET to enable the automatic anomaly detection using statistical testing (Vaidyanathan & Cross, 2003) . Moreover, Hamerly and Elkan proposed a naive Bayesian-based model for disk failure prediction (Hamerly & Elkan, 2001) and Garg, Puliafito and Trivedi proposed a Semi-Markov reward model (Garg, Puliafito, & Trivedi, 1995) , both focusing on failure detection using statistical or automation techniques. Although these proposed works are able to alleviate the management burden for system administrators, they ask the people to input model parameters, which is difficult for the people without solid mathematic or data mining background. Without properly setting of parameters, the model-based methods would have the difficulty of generating and maintaining an accurate model, especially given the unprecedented size and complexity of large-scale systems.
Besides the previously mentioned related work, recently, data mining and machine learning have received growing attention for failure diagnosis and prognosis. These methods extract fault patterns from system normal behaviors and detect abnormal observations based on the learned knowledge without assuming a priori model ahead of time. For example, in (Sahoo et al., 2003; Vilalta & Ma, 2002) , the authors have presented several methods to predict failure events in IBM clusters. Fox et al. proposed an anomaly detection approach that considers both simple operational statistics and structural change in a complex distributed system (Fox, Kiciman, & Patterson, 2004) . Fu and Xu (2007) have developed a framework called hPREFECTS for failure prediction in networked computing systems. Other representative studies include system log analysis (Oliner & Stearley, 2007; Schroeder & Gibson, 2006) and fault detection in syslogs (Stearley & Oliner, 2008) . Different from the model-based method, our approach belongs to the data-driven category (i.e., making decisions by gathering and analyzing large amounts of data), it focuses more on building a systematic framework for real time anomaly detection over data streams from large-scale systems .
With the emerging requirements of mining data streams, several techniques have been proposed to handle the data incrementally Liang et al., 2008) However, their approach identified anomalies based on the local-continuity property of the trajectory, while our method does not make such an assumption. Our approach is close to the work of (Ge et al.,2010) , where they proposed an incremental approach to maintain the top-K evolving trajectories for traffic monitoring. However, their approach mainly focused on the geospatial data instances and ignored the temporal correlations, while our approach explicitly considers the temporal information of the data instances. Moreover, all the aforementioned works focused on the anomaly detection of a single stream, while our work is designed to discover the contextual collective anomalies over multiple data streams.
Conclusions
Anomaly detection is always a top priority for distributed system management and it draws the attention of many researchers in recent years. Due to the increasing of data scale and data complexity, existing anomaly detection methods gradually lose their abilities. To improve the effectiveness and efficiency of anomaly detection and to identify new types of anomaly, in this paper, we propose a real time anomaly detection framework to identify the contextual collective anomalies from a collection of streams. Our proposed method firstly quantifies the snapshot level anomaly of each stream based on the contextual information. Then the contextual information and the historical information are used in combination to quantify the anomaly severity of each stream.
Based on the distribution of the stream anomaly scores, an implicit threshold is dynamically calculated and the alerts are triggered accordingly. To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed framework, several sets of experiments are conducted to demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency.
There are some future works we need to do to address the limitations of the current solution.
The current proposed method can only be applied to the homogeneous distributed systems. In the real world, there are a lot of heterogeneous distributed systems that the behaviors of the nodes are not all the same. For example, the master node and the slave nodes would behave differently in the Hadoop distributed systems. In order to conduct the anomaly detection on this kind of distributed systems, a hybrid method that combines offline learning and online learning should be designed.
For such a solution, the offline learning techniques would be used to learn the signatures of the normal behaviors of the system its history. Then the learned model would be applied to conduct the online learning for real time anomaly detection. Due to the highly dynamics of the distributed systems, this solution should be able to self-adaptive.
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